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 1. Complexity is perhaps the most striking feature of the area of recognition and 
‘enforcement’1 of foreign judgments in Spain. Hence, it may seem paradoxical that this 
complication stems largely from the proliferation of international and Community 
instruments whose essential purpose is to simplify (recognition). But the fact is that 
each convention or regulation, in striving to make things easier, lays down different 
conditions and/or introduces a specific type of recognition and/or proceeding. Indeed, 
the whole area is plagued by special cases as a direct consequence of both the 
‘internationalist euphoria’ experienced by the Spanish system in the last quarter of 
XXth Century2, and the encouragement of the ‘fifth Community freedom’ or promotion 
of the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions by Community authorities3. 
                                                 
* This work is part of Research Project SEJ2006-1394/JURI, “Integración europea y globalización: 
el principio de reconocimiento mutuo en su proyección a los documentos y a las resoluciones 
judiciales” (“European integration and globalisation: the principle of mutual recognition as it 
applies to judicial documents and decisions”), financed by the Spanish Ministry of Education and 
Science and the FEDER. Chief Researcher: Dr. Pilar Rodríguez Mateos. 
 
1 When the term ‘enforcement’ is used to refer to one the mentioned area of Private International 
Law (PIL), i.e., the area of ‘recognition and enforcement’, it actually means recognition of the 
enforceability of a foreign decision. It does not refer to the enforcement of a decision itself. Hence the 
inverted commas, which are intended to warn that the term is imprecise in this context. On inaccurate use 
of the term ‘enforcement’ and its consequences, see §4 below. 
2 Cf. FERNÁNDEZ ROZAS, J.C., “Problemas de asimilación de los tratados internacionales de 
Derecho internacional privado en un sistema de base estatal: la experiencia española”, Mélanges Fritz 
Sturm¸ vol. II, Éditions Juridiques de l’Université de Liège, Liège, 1999, pp. 1447-1468, esp. p. 1447. 
3 In its initial stages, the back-up of such freedom gave rise to the Convention on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, done at Brussels on 27 
September 1968 (OJEC C 189, 28 July 1990), hereafter BC; to Council Regulation (EC) no. 44/2001 of 
22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (OJEC L12, January 2000), hereafter Reg. 44/2001; and Council Regulation (EC) no. 
2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
 However, the complicatedness cannot be attributed solely to the internationalisation 
of sources. Much of the responsibility lies with a national legislator incapable of 
ameliorating the difficulties entailed in the handling of such a multiplicity of 
regulations, when it comes either to negotiating conventions or to devising a more 
appropriate internal regulation. Two evidences of this fact are (1) that the reform of the 
rules of civil proceedings that took place in 2000 did not cover the recognition and 
‘enforcement’ of foreign judgments4; and (2) that the subsequent amendment5 of the 
rules maintained in force resulted in a formally dubious ‘stopgap’ which further 
presented defects in a number of aspects6. The outcome is that the Spanish system is 
composed of many instruments that envisage many different proceedings7 and types of 
                                                                                                                                               
judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 1347/2000 (OJEC L338, 23 December 2003), hereafter Reg. 2201/2003. Strictly speaking, the 
regulations culminating the process can not be considered instruments for the recognition of foreign 
judgments, as we argue later on (§4). 
4 The sole Repeal Provision of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil (Civil Proceeding Act, Law 
1/2000 of 7 January, BOE, no. 7, 8-I-2000, corr. err. ibid., no. 90, 14-IV-2000, and ibid., no. 180, 28-VII-
2000, hereafter LEC 2000), retains arts. 954 to 958 of the Civil Proceeding Act of 3 February 1881, 
Gaceta de Madrid, 5 to 22-II-1881, corr. err. ibid., 5-III-1881 (hereafter, LEC 1881) until the entry into 
force of the upcoming International Legal Cooperation Act (twentieth final provision, LEC 2000). This 
Act was supposed to be presented by the Government not more than 6 months after the entry into force of 
the new civil procedure act. 
5 See Organic Law 19/2003 of 23 December amending the Judiciary Act, Organic Law 6/85, 
BOE, no. 309, 26-XII-2003, and the Fiscal, Administrative and Social Measures Act, Law 62/2003 of 30 
December, ibid., no. 313, 31-XII-2003. 
6 See my article “Competencia de los juzgados de primera instancia para conocer del 
procedimiento de exequátur. (Reflexiones a raíz de la modificación de las normas de la LEC de 1881, por 
la LO 19/2003 y por la Ley 62/2003)”, Diario La Ley, no. 6039, 14 June 2004, pp. 1-5. Other criticisms 
of the reform have come from, inter alia, ÁLVAREZ RODRÍGUEZ, A., “La Sala 1ª del Tribunal Supremo ya 
no es competente para conocer del reconocimiento de las soluciones judiciales y arbitrales extranjeras”, in 
Derecho Migratorio y Extranjería, no. 5, March 2004, pp. 39-68; and OÑA LÓPEZ, M.M., “La 
modificación del artículo 955 de la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil de 1881: la atribución de competencia 
para conocer del procedimiento de exequátur a los Juzgados de primera instancia”, REEI, 2004 
(http://www.reei.org/reei8/OnaLopez_reei8_.pdf, last visited on 31 March 2008). 
 7 Indeed, there are mainly four: (1) The proceeding regulated in arts. 955 to 958 
LEC 1881, usually known as the internal exequatur proceeding; (2) The proceeding laid 
down in the BC, which is identical to the one subsequently regulated in the Convention 
on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters done 
at Lugano on 16 September 1988 (BOE, no. 251, 20-X-1994, corr. err. ibid., no. 8, 10-I-
1995 (referred to hereafter as LC and the LC proceeding); (3) The proceeding under 
Reg. 44/2001, that differs from the CB proceeding in a good number of respects. The 
same changes likewise affect the new Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters done at Lugano on 30 
October 2007 (OJEU L337 of 21 December 2007, hereafter LC2): where the LC2 is 
applicable the proceeding to be followed will be substantially similar to that envisaged 
in Reg. 44/2001: for that reason this new instrument is not dealt with separately in the 
rest of this article; (4) The proceeding under Reg. 2201/2003, that remains in many 
respects closer to the one originally regulated by the BC, although it also shares features 
in common with that of the other Regulation. We would note that there may be other 
proceedings, albeit confined to the recognition of judgments on specific matters, like the 
one provided for judgments relating to the costs and expenses of proceedings in the 
Hague Convention on civil procedure of 1 March 1954 (BOE no. 297, 13/12/1961). 
This proceeding is set in motion by a request through diplomatic channels (unless there 
is a convention between the State of origin and the requested State where under a 
recognition. This diversity considerably complicates the application of the rules by the 
authorities. 
 The specific purpose of this article is to analyse Spanish practice as it relates to the 
procedural aspects of recognition. To that end, given that courts can only act at the 
instance of the parties (nemo iudex sine actore), it will be best to begin by examining 
the scope of party autonomy for purposes of pursuing recognition proceedings (II). Next 
a parallel analysis of the norms regulating the various procedures and the practice of 
Spanish authorities in applying these norms will be conducted, largely on the basis of 
timing. The analysis begins with the different proceedings, from the standpoints of the 
competent authorities (III.1), the intervening parties (III.2) and the documents to be 
submitted (III.3). Next a special attention will be paid to the fundamental issues relating 
to the course of the successive stages of the proceedings, namely first instance (IV.I), 
with special reference to the adoption of provisional measures (IV.II) and the rules 




II. SCOPE OF PARTY AUTONOMY  
 
1. Choosing the type of recognition or/and the proceeding  
 
 2. The instrument applicable to the recognition of a foreign judgment specifies the 
type of recognition that is available and the appropriate proceeding, if needed. For 
instance, where automatic recognition is provided —i.e. the regulation or convention 
either expressly contemplates the possibility of recognition without any prior 
proceedings8, or it differentiates between recognition and a declaration of enforceability 
                                                                                                                                               
request may be processed directly by the interested party (see art. 18) and there is no 
conflict. See Auto del Tribunal Supremo (hereafter, ATS) (Civil Chamber) of 17 
September 1996 (Westlaw, RJ 1998/3556) and ATS (Civil Chamber) 12 May 1998 
(ibid., 1998/448). 
8 Under the Spanish system, the instruments that expressly provide automatic recognition are: the 
Community regulations mentioned above (see arts. 33.1 Reg. 44/2001 and 21.1 Reg. 2201/2003); the LC 
(see art. 26.1); the LC2 (see art. 33.1); the Convention on recognition and enforcement of court judgments 
and transactions and enforceable public documents in civil and commercial matters, between Spain and 
the Federal Republic of Germany done at Bonn on 14 November 1983 (BOE, no. 230, 24-IX-1992: see 
art. 10.1); the Convention on recognition and enforcement of court judgments and transactions and 
enforceable public documents in civil and commercial matters, between Spain and Austria done at Vienna 
on 17 February 1984 (ibid., no. 270, 29-VIII-1985: see art. 12); with certain restrictions, the Convention 
on legal cooperation in civil matters between the Kingdom of Spain and the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Brazil done at Madrid on 13 April 1989 (ibid., no. 164, 10-VII-1991, corr. err. in ibid., no. 
193, 13-VIII-1991: see art. 18.1); the Treaty between the Kingdom of Spain and the Republic of El 
Salvador on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters done at 
Madrid on 7 November 2000 (ibid., no. 256, 25-X-2001: see art. 10); the Convention on recognition and 
enforcement of judgments and arbitral decisions in civil and commercial matters between the United 
States of Mexico and the Kingdom of Spain done at Madrid on 17 April 1989 (BOE, no. 85, 9-IV-1991, 
corr. err. in ibid., nos. 108, 6-VI-1991 and 226, 20-VIII-1991: see art. 8); the Convention between Spain 
and Romania on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters done ad referendum at Bucharest on 17 November 1997 (ibid., no. 134, 5-VI-1999: see art. 11.1); 
and the Convention between the Kingdom of Spain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics–Russian 
Federation on legal assistance in civil matters done at Madrid on 26 October 1990 (ibid., no. 151, 25-VI-
1997: see art. 24.1). Moreover, conventions which use the term recognition (or ‘enforcement’) by 
operation of the law or ipso iure (“de pleno derecho” in Spanish; “de plein droit” in French) do so as a 
synonym of automatic recognition. For instance, the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and 
(or ‘enforcement’), restricting the conduct of a proceeding to “enforcement”9 and not 
awarding competence to any particular authority10 —such automatic recognition is 
presented as alternative to a principal action for recognition. Therefore, the parties are 
entitled not only to choose whether or not to apply for recognition, but also to select the 
way in which the decision will be recognized. As a result an authority competent to 
conduct a principal request for recognition cannot reject it simply because the judgment 
may be subject to automatic recognition11.  
 On the other hand, when recognition must necessarily be by way of a proceeding, as 
is the case whenever the Spanish autonomous regime is applicable12––other than in the 
                                                                                                                                               
Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption of 29 May 1993 (ibid., no. 182, 2-VIII-1995: see art. 
23); and the Convention on changes of surnames and forenames signed at Istanbul on 4 September 1958 
(ibid., no. 15, 8-I-1977: see art. 3). 
9 Hague Convention concerning the powers of authorities and the law applicable in respect of the 
protection of infants of 5 October 1961 (ibid., no. 199, 20-VIII-1987: vide art. 7); the Convention 
between Spain and France on recognition of judicial and arbitral decisions and authentic acts in civil and 
commercial matters of 28 May 1969 (ibid., no. 63, 14-III-1970: see art. 13); the Convention between 
Spain and Italy on legal assistance and recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters done at Madrid on 22 May 1973 (ibid., no. 273, 15-XI-1977: see art. 21); and the Convention on 
judicial cooperation in civil, commercial and administrative matters between the Kingdom of Spain and 
the Kingdom of Morocco done at Madrid on 30 May 1977 (ibid., no. 151, 25-VI-1997: see art. 25). The 
proposal to identify conventions which provide for automatic recognition with the two abovementioned 
criteria comes from ARENAS GARCÍA, R., in “Frontera entre el reconocimiento y la ejecución de una 
sentencia extranjera en materia de pensión compensatoria”, AEDIPr, 2004, pp. 944-959, esp. p. 949. I 
accept his criticism of a former opinion of mine in which I denied the existence of automatic recognition 
in the Franco-Spanish convention. However, I disagree that the internal laws must enable such 
recognition in order to understand that this convention, like the other conventions cited above, enables 
automatic recognition. If we differentiate strictly between the types of recognition that the internal laws 
may admit and the proceedings provided for its implementation, we must admit that the referral made by 
each of the above-cited bilateral conventions to such internal laws is confined to the proceeding for 
declaration of enforceability. Hence automatic recognition may be admitted even if it is not provided for 
in LEC 1881. The Auto de la Audiencia Provincial de (hereafter, AAP) Barcelona (Section 1) of 28 
February 2002 (Westlaw, JUR 2002/136809) arguably bears out the interpretation that the Franco-Spanish 
Convention provides for automatic recognition, if not without eliciting criticisms on the part of the 
Spanish doctrine: see the remarks on this subject by OROZCO HERMOSO, M., in AEDIPr, 2004, pp. 851-
853. 
10 The Convention on judicial assistance between the Kingdom of Spain and the Republic of 
Bulgaria done at Sofia on 23 May 1993 (BOE, no. 155, 30-VI-1994) cannot therefore be said to provide 
for automatic recognition: although it differentiates between recognition and ‘enforcement’ and when 
alluding to the latter refers only to the need for a proceeding (see art. 20(1)), it attributes jurisdiction for 
both recognition and enforcement to certain specific authorities (in Spain, the Juez de Primera Instancia -
Judge of First Instance: hereafter, JPI-: see art. 20.4), and hence it must be construed that such recognition 
has to be effected through a procedure before those authorities. 
11 Thus, AAP Barcelona (Section 1) of 28 February 2002 (cit.) was presumably inexact in 
correcting the JPI who refused jurisdiction to recognize a French divorce judgment and noted that the 
competent body was the Supreme Court (which was the case at that time). Where the AP erred was in 
stating that the party interested in securing recognition could not appeal to the TS but had to file with the 
Judge in charge of the Registry where the divorce would have to be registered. Having stated—as it 
had— that the Franco-Spanish bilateral convention allows for automatic recognition, the AP should have 
asserted that both options were available. If the parties wished to secure a definitive ruling on recognition, 
there would have been nothing to prevent them applying to the TS. A similar error was committed by the 
JPI in an issue which the AP Seville (Section 5) subsequently resolved on appeal by Auto of 21 October 
2005 (ibid., JUR 2006/173255), when the JPI refused an application for recognition of a Swedish divorce 
decree on the ground that the specific recognition procedure could not be pursued because automatic 
recognition was available. 
12 Following the criteria noted above for identifying when automatic recognition is available (see 
supra, note 9), it was argued that the LEC 1881 admitted such recognition, given that art. 955 referred 
only to the ‘enforcement’ of foreign judgments (cf. ARENAS GARCÍA, R., in “Frontera entre el 
case of judgments delivered in voluntary jurisdiction proceedings or of the regulation 
contained in article 84.1 RRC13–– the margin for decision is reduced to the actual 
opening of the proceedings. Rules governing the corresponding proceeding, as 
procedural rules, are non-discretionary, and so entitled parties may decide whether or 
not to request recognition of the judgment, but they may not choose the proceedings 
whereby this is to be done14. Hence it will be necessary to follow the internal (Spanish) 
exequatur procedure not only when there is no applicable convention but also when the 
applicable instrument remits to “the internal procedure of the requested State”15, even if 
                                                                                                                                               
reconocimiento y la ejecución…”, loc. cit., p. 948; see also VIRGÓS SORIANO, M. and GARCIMARTÍN 
ALFÉREZ, J.F, Derecho procesal civil internacional, 2ª ed., Civitas, Madrid, 2007, p. 580). However, the 
reform of art. 955 LEC 1881 introduced by Law 62/2003 (cit.), as the author himself notes, removed that 
possibility, by attributing the competence to ‘examine applications for recognition and enforcement of 
judgments and other foreign judicial and arbitral decisions’ (my italics) to the JPI. There can therefore be 
no question of automatic recognition of decisions coming under the LEC 1881 despite the fact that 
Spanish courts have sometimes done so. Concerning a Bolivian divorce, see ad ex AAP Barcelona 
(Section 12) no. 20/2007 of 23 January (Westlaw, JUR 2007/177622) and my own “Note” to this decision 
in REDI, 2007, in press. 
13 For an analysis of the current treatment of foreign judgments in matters of 
voluntary jurisdiction and an alternative proposal—subjection to exequatur—see DE 
MIGUEL ASENSIO, P., Eficacia de las resoluciones extranjeras de jurisdicción 
voluntaria, Eurolex, Madrid, 1997, passim. Regarding the recognition of adoptions 
formalised before foreign authorities, see art. 27 of the International Adoption Act, Law 
54/2007 of 28 December, BOE no 312, 29/12/2007. For its part, art. 84.1 RRC allows 
the Civil Registrar to give effects to a foreign decision (of divorce or annulment of 
marriage) that is presented merly in support of the capacity for a registrable act 
(marriage), as long as the decision does not conflict with public policy. Hence, it gives 
the possibility to recognize automatically foreign decisions that are not susceptible of 
registration, i.e. that do not affect any Spanish national nor refer to acts (mariage or the 
decision itself) which have taken place in Spanish territory. On this practice and the 
risks that it entails, see both the “Note on AAP Barcelona (Section 12) no 20/2007 of 23 
January”, cited above and my “Note on Res. DGRN (1ª) of 6 November 2000”, REDI, 
2001, pp. 537-541. 
14 Under the current rules it is not possible to secure a ruling from the Spanish courts which 
accepted the substance of a foreign decision other than by way of the appropriate recognition proceeding. 
It would therefore be improper to order maintenance payments decreed in a foreign judgment if the 
creditor has filed suit to obtain a conviction by means of any other type of procedure. This was the ruling 
in AAP La Rioja (Sole Section) no. 43/2003 of 25 April (Westlaw, JUR 2003/150981). Nonetheless, for 
the opposite view see SAP Santa Cruz de Tenerife (Section 1) no. 89/1999 of 6 February (ibid., AC 
1999/4117) and SAP Málaga (Section 5) no. 1059/2004 of 27 September (ibid., JUR 2004/292433). The 
options left to the parties in the foreign procedure are limited to three: (1) application for recognition of 
the decision (and enforceability where applicable); (2) inaction; and (3) opening of fresh proceedings, 
within the framework of which the foreign decision may only be introduced as an element of proof or to 
oppose res judicata.  
15 See Hague Convention of 15 April 1958 concerning the recognition and enforcement of 
decisions relating to maintenance obligations towards children (BOE, no. 271, 12-IX-1973: see art. 6); the 
Hague Convention of 2 October 1973 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions relating to 
Maintenance Obligations (ibid., no. 192, 12-VIII-1987, corr. err. ibid no. 282, 25-XI-1987: see art. 13); 
the European Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions concerning Custody of Children 
and on Restoration of Custody of Children and Restoration of Custody, done at Luxembourg on 20 May 
1980 (ibid., no. 210, 1-IX-1984: see art. 14); the Convention on judicial assistance in civil and 
commercial matters between the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria and the Kingdom of Spain, 
done at Madrid on 24 February 2005 (ibid., no. 103, 1-V-2006: see art. 20); the Convention on legal 
assistance, recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil matters between Spain and the Socialist 
Republic of Czechoslovakia—now the Czech Republic and Slovakia—done at Madrid on 4 May 1987 
(ibid., no. 290, 3-XII-1988, corr. err. ibid., no. 22, 26-I-1989: see art. 25.3); the Treaty between the 
that procedure has to be ‘straightforward (or simple) and swift’16 and although such 
internal procedure may well be neither of these things17. It is worth noting in this 
connection that the procedures provided in the LC, Reg. 44/2001 and Reg. 2201/2003 
can—and should18 —be used only for purposes of recognition of foreign decisions 
falling within their respective scope.  
 The foregoing, however, requires two qualifications. The first is that the parties have 
the possibility of obviating the effects of the foreign judgment by the means of bringing 
up fresh proceedings on the same cause of action in Spain19. Spanish jurisprudence let 
conclude that the interested parties may decide both when20 to request their cooperation 
so as to confer on the judgment the authority accorded to it in the foreign State and 
whether they wish such recognition or prefer to seek a new ruling from the Spanish 
courts and ignore the foreign judgment21. But the fact is that such a possibility will 
depend not only on the action of any other legitimate party but also on whether the 
judgment is susceptible of automatic recognition. Hence, when one of the parties 
affected by a foreign judgment (unrecognised) brings a new proceeding with the same 
cause of action against the other, the success that he or she may hope to achieve by 
securing a ruling from the Spanish court that renders the foreign judgment without 
effect in Spain22 will depend first and foremost on the other legitimate party not 
                                                                                                                                               
Kingdom of Spain and the Chinese People's Republic on judicial assistance in civil and commercial 
matters, done at Beijing on 2 May 1993 (ibid., no. 26, 31-I-1994, corr. err. ibid. no. 60, 11-III-1994: see 
art. 18); the Convention between Spain and Israel for mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters, done at Jerusalem on 30 May 1989 (ibid. no. 3, 3-I-1991, corr. err. ibid., 
no. 20, 23-I-1991: see art. 5); the  Convention on judicial assistance in civil and commercial matters 
between the Kingdom of Spain and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, done on 12 September 2006 
(ibid., no. 267, 8-XI-2006; see art. 20); the Convention on legal cooperation between the Kingdom of 
Spain and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, done at Montevideo on 4 November 1987 (ibid., no. 103, 
30-IV-1998: see art. 10); and art. 20 of the Spanish-Bulgarian Convention (cit.). 
16 See art. 14 of the Convention between the Kingdom of Spain and the Kingdom of Morocco on 
judicial assistance, recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions in matters of the right of custody 
and the right of visits and return of children, done at Madrid on 30 May 1997 (BOE no. 150, 24-VI-1997); 
art. 14 of the 1980 Luxembourg Convention, cit.; art. 11 of the Spanish-German Convention, cit.; and art. 
13 of the Convention between Spain and Austria, cit..  
17 Nonetheless, in the context of the recognition of a German decision coming under the bilateral 
convention, the TS (Civil Chamber), which had jurisdiction then, asserted in an Auto of 10 September 
1996 (Westlaw, RJ 1998/3555) that the exequatur procedure was ‘a manifestation of the criteria of 
rapidity and simplicity’ required by that convention. 
18 In this connection see the critical comments relating to the praxis of courts which apply the 
exequatur procedure of the 1881 LEC, instead of following the provisions of these instruments by LÓPEZ-
TARRUELLA MARTÍNEZ, A. in “Reconocimiento y ejecución de sentencias en el marco del espacio judicial 
europeo”, AEDIPr, 2003, pp. 821-824, esp. pp. 822 and 823.  
19 This possibility is to be denied in the frame of Reg. 44/2001, as a result of the De Wolf Case: 
see WAUTELET, P., “Art. 33”, MAGNUS, U. and MANKOWSKI, P. (Eds.), Brussels I Regulation, Munchen, 
Sellier, 2007, pp. 547-555, esp. p. 551. 
20 The act of recognition would have no period of limitation: the independence and autonomy of 
the procedure are such that if the rights recognised therein should have lapsed, such an objection must be 
entered in the enforcement proceedings subsequent to the award of exequatur: see ATS (Civil Chamber) 
of 23 May 2000 (Westlaw, RJ 2000/4382). 
21 In the event that there is a foreign judgment ordering maintenance and the cooperation 
machinery provided in the New York Convention on recovery of maintenance abroad of 26 June 1956 
(BOE, 24-XI-1966) is invoked, the mediating Spanish authority—i.e. the State Attorney—must opt for 
recognition rather than filing a new complaint since the former is the faster and simpler way, as stressed 
by SOTO MOYA, M., in his comments on the Sentencia (hereafter, S) AP Tarragona (Section 3) of 24 
November 2002, in AEDIPr, 2004, pp. 912-914. 
22 In such a situation ‘recognition of the foreign judgment in Spain (…) collides ineluctably with 
the effects of the domestic judgment, and most particularly with res judicata (…), which bars any other 
ruling between the same parties on the same subject that might be different, risking of undermining the 
claiming res judicata. In this context, the mere presentation of the foreign judgment in 
the proceedings is not enough, as it would be assumed that is simply being cited as 
evidence23. The proceeding, then, may conclude with the delivery of a new decision by 
the Spanish court. Party autonomy will have prevented recognition of the foreign 
judgment, which the court is powerless to impose24. If on the other hand the defendant 
files a plea of res judicata, its fate will depend on the type of recognition that is 
applicable. Should the foreign decision be susceptible of automatic—and incidental as 
the case may be—recognition, res judicata exception would be admitted25. But when it 
is not possible for the Spanish court itself to rule on recognition, the plea will normally 
be denied and the procedure initiated in Spain be pursued in order to secure a new 
decision on the merits of the case26. Aiming at preventing opportunistic behaviour, 
duplication of procedures and conflicting judgments, it would arguably be preferable to 
apply for and grant a stay of the (new) proceeding (ex art. 43 of LEC 2000). If the 
                                                                                                                                               
harmony that must necessarily prevail among the judicial decisions that form part of the internal order of 
States in order to avoid irreparable harm to legal security (…)’: cf. ATS (Civil Chamber, Sole Section) of 
11 March 2003  (Westlaw, JUR 2003/87983) and references therein. 
23 See SAP Pontevedra (Section 1) 158/2000 of 20 March (Westlaw, JUR 2006/126785) and 
AAP Barcelona (Section 12) no. 211/2006 of 20 September (ibid., AC 2007/784). When a foreign 
judgment is exhibited or submitted with the intention of accrediting some fact that is deemed proven 
therein, the findings of the judgment need not be recognised. In such a case, what is submitted is a public 
document containing the judgment, which as a foreign document must meet the requirements set out in 
arts. 323.2 and 144 LEC 2000 to have the same force in Spain as Spanish public documents (full force of 
the facts contained therein, ex art. 319 LEC 2000). Having regard to these, see JIMÉNEZ BLANCO, P., “La 
eficacia probatoria de los documentos públicos extranjeros”, AEDIPr, 2000, pp. 365-404. An express 
provision on the extension of probatory force without recognition can be found in art. 8 of the Hispano-
Mexican Convention (cit.). 
24 In this connection, in AAP Gerona (Section 2) no. 117/2002 of 8 July (Westlaw, 2002/243696) 
an appeal is uphold against a decision (AJPI no. 3 of Blanes of 26 November 2001) refusing to admit an 
application for divorce based on the existence of an English divorce decree which the appellant presented 
in evidence of the absence of cohabitation and which the JPI considered had to go through the recognition 
proceeding. For a similar case see SAP La Coruña (Section 4) no. 12/2006 of 25 January (ibid., JUR 
2006/78910). 
25 See AAP Valladolid (Section 1) no. 75/2006 of 12 June (Westlaw, AC 2007/66) in connection 
with a Bulgarian divorce decree. Given that automatic recognition is available under arts. 23 and 25 of the 
Hispano-Moroccan Convention (cit.) according to the interpretation noted earlier (see note 9 above), the 
res judicata exception should not properly be rejected on the ground of absence of a principal action for 
recognition of Moroccan divorce decrees; but see, in this sense, SAP Murcia (Section 1) no. 166/2003 of 
12 May (Westlaw., AC 2003/1676) and AP Málaga (Section 5) no. 384/2004 of 31 March (ibid., JUR 
2004/128865). Note to the contrary how in SAP Barcelona (Section 12) of 23 April 2003 (ibid., JUR 
2003/254214) the Court used the arguments presented here to affirm the possibility of automatic 
recognition of a Moroccan judgment, even although it eventually rejected the res judicata exception on 
the ground that the judgment did not meet the conditions of enforceability laid down in the Convention. 
Again, the possibility of automatic recognition of a French judgment is implied in SAP Orense (Section 
1) no. 213/2004 of 4 June (ibid., JUR 2001/236463). In this decision, the judgment of the JPI that granted 
the divorce was set aside given that the institutional instrument then in force (Reg. 1347/2000) was not 
applicable for reasons of timing. The French divorce decree concerned could nonetheless possibly be 
automatically recognized through the bilateral convention between France and Spain (cit.: see note 9 
above), but this possibility is not mentioned in the Galician court’s judgment. See comments on this 
judgment by JIMÉNEZ SÁNCHEZ, M.Á., in AEDIPr, 2003, pp. 888-893. In the case of an Italian judgment, 
SAP Álava (Section 1) no. 443/1995 of 20 September (Westlaw, AC 1995/2217) denied the force of the 
objection raised by the party against whom recognition was sought, but not without reason given that the 
latter invoked litis pendens rather than res judicata. 
26 See SAP Alicante of 5 May 2000 and SAP Guipúzcoa (Section 3) of 11 December 2000 and 
comments by MARÍN PEIDRO, L., in AEDIPr, 2002, pp. 682-686. Regarding two Romanian judgments 
presented in different procedures on matrimonial disputes, see AAP Tarragona (Section 3) of 29 
November 2006 (Westlaw, JUR 2007/223323) and SAP Asturias (Section 4) no. 321/2006 of 29 
September 2006 (ibid., AC 2006/1814).  
foreign judgment was delivered before the initiation of the proceeding, its deferral 
would allow the party opposing res judicata to secure a ruling on recognition of the 
foreign judgment from the competent authority through the appropriate procedure27. 
  
 3. A second point regarding the exercise of party autonomy is that it is possible in 
particular cases to choose the procedure to be followed for recognition with respect to a 
principal issue. This occurs when the foreign judgment is subject to more than one 
instrument and the rules of compatibility provide a choice in the application of rules of 
procedure. For example, such a situation arises with the application of the LC or Reg. 
44/2001 and of a convention relating to a specific subject28, i.e. when the foreign 
judgment requiring recognition is a maintenance decree given in another State party to 
the LC or in another Member State which is at the same time a party to the Hague 
Convention of 197329 or the Hague Convention of 195830. In that case under the LC and 
Reg. 44/2001 it is compulsory to apply the conditions for recognition provided in the 
specific convention (Hague Convention 1973 or Hague Convention 1958)31, and to 
allow the provisions of the LC or the Regulation to be applied in respect of the 
proceedings provided for therein. It is therefore up to the party applying for a 
declaration of enforceability whether the BC or the Reg. 44/2001 proceeding is to be 
followed if the party so requests, or the internal exequatur procedure referred to in the 
cited Hague Conventions32.  
 
 
2. Opting for non-recognition 
 
 4. There is another way in which the parties may exercise their free will as regards 
the extra-territorial effects of non-Spanish decisions, rooted in the possibility of certain 
decisions given by courts in other Member States (except Denmark), i.e., decisions 
carrying the ‘European order’ certification, being enforced regardless of any 
                                                 
27 Cf. VIRGÓS SORIANO, M. and GARCIMARTÍN ALFÉREZ, F.J., op. cit., pp. 561-567, p. 659. 
28 In the LC, the special convention may be prior or subsequent to the former’s entry into force 
(see arts 57 LC and 67.5 LC2); in Reg. 44/2001, thanks to the ‘AETR effect’, provision is made for such 
compatibility only in respect of prior conventions (art 71). 
29 Cit. In this respect it is worth noting that this Convention does not bar the application of any 
other instrument that links the requested State with the State of origin (art. 23) and is applicable 
regardless of when the judgment was given; and it will only be affected by this date for purposes of 
declaring the enforceability of payments still outstanding prior to the entry into force of the Convention: 
see art. 24.  
30 Cit. Note that the Hague Convention 1973 would only replace the latter in the case of relations 
between States which are not parties to both, ex art. 29 Hague Convention 1973.  
31 Such an application is far from usual. In all the cases we have analysed in connection with the 
recognition of Swiss maintenance decrees, the LC has also been applied in respect of the conditions of 
recognition: see, for instance, AAP Málaga (Section 5) no. 31/2001 of 31 January (Westlaw, AC 
2001/1836) and SAP Orense (Section 1) of 7 March 2006 (ibid., AC 2006/1548). HC 1973 has also not 
been applied to conditions of recognition in some cases where this has come under the BC or Reg. 
44/2001; for example, German maintenance decrees coming under the BC in AAP Castellón (Section 3) 
no. 478/2000 of 8 September (ibid., AC 2000/5116); and with regard to Reg. 44/2001 (without even a 
mention of HC 73) in AAP Murcia (Section 5) no. 27/2007 of 16 March (ibid., JUR 2007/272936). In 
connection with a Netherlands judgment to which only the BC was applied, see ATS (Civil Chamber) no. 
742/1995 of 21 July 2000 (ibid., RJ 2000/5501). The closest we have found to a correct interpretation of 
the compatibility between these instruments is in AAP Gerona (Section 2) no. 190/2000 of 22 November 
(ibid., JUR 2001/62793), in which the conditions of the BC and HC 1973 were applied cumulatively. 
32 For an example of application of the internal exequatur procedure omitting any mention of the 
BC (which was applicable at the time) in a case of recognition of the enforceability of two German 
maintenance decrees, see ATS (Civil Chamber, Section 1) of 17 May 2005 (ibid., JUR 2005/150613). 
recognition33. Be it said that the granting of the certification that the Member State’s 
decision needs from the authority of the State of origin in order to receive such an order, 
and likewise the invocation thereof in the requested State, depends not only on 
compliance with the conditions set forth in the relevant instrument but also on the will 
of the parties in the foreign procedure. 
 To understand the scope of this option, it is important to remember that generally 
speaking, where the intention is to call for the enforcement of a decision, if it is a 
foreign one, then between the proceedings in which it was delivered and the 
enforcement procedure in Spain there must be another distinct and independent stage, 
namely the procedure for declaration of enforceability34. According to the principle 
nulla executio sine titulo, an enabling instrument will have to be obtained from the 
competent authority of the forum, by means of a specific procedure35. Hence, the 
enforceability of a foreign judgment also needs to be recognised, and therefore we 
should stress that the term ‘enforcement’ ought not to be used in conjunction with the 
term ‘recognition’ in the context discussed here36. The possibility we noted of initiating 
enforcement proceedings without prior proceedings for a declaration of enforceability 
would therefore be an exception; but not, strictly speaking, to the said principle of nulla 
executio…. The apparent contradiction is resolved by a relatively recent development, 
namely the emergence and gradual spread of a Community lex fori as distinct from the 
lex fori of States. Its implantation, stimulated by the extension of the mutual recognition 
principle to judgments of Member States, has arguably led in its latter stages37 to the 
introduction of a new concept to European legal systems—namely that of a ‘European 
judgment’ whose enforceability, regulated by the Community lex fori, is not contingent 
on recognition.  
 
 




A. ‘Objective’ and ‘functional’ jurisdiction 
 
                                                 
33 Under arts. 41 and 42 of Reg. 2201/2003; in Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested 
claims, OJEC L 143 of 30 April 2004; in Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 12 December creating a European order for payment procedure, OJEU L 399 of 30 
December 2006; and in Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a European Small Claims Procedure, ibid., L 199 of 31 July 2007. 
34 See AAP Madrid (Section 13) of 12 February 2002 (Westlaw, JUR 2002/132026) and AAP 
Tarragona (Section 1) of 10 May 2001 (ibid., JUR 2001/197938).  
35 Recognition of the enforceability of the foreign judgment cannot be automatic, despite the 
abundance of practical examples where such recognition has been given, erroneously, for purposes of a 
declaration of enforceability. See ARENAS GARCÍA, R., “Reconocimiento y ejecución de sentencias al 
amparo del Convenio de Bruselas de 1968”, AEDIPr, 2002, pp. 550-558, esp. p. 556 and 557).  
36 As noted above in note 1. This confusion affects the practice of the authorities. It is quite 
common for the party requesting exequatur to ask for enforcement—in the strict sense of the word—of 
the judgment from the body that actually decides on recognition, and it is also quite normal for the latter 
to grant it and order non-provisional enforcement measures. In this connection see §13 below. 
37 See OREJUDO PRIETO DE LOS MOZOS, P., “Repercusiones del reconocimiento mutuo de las 
resoluciones judiciales en los sistemas autónomos: excesos y carencias”, AEDIPr, 2006, pp. 481-502. 
 5. Through the reforms introduced by Organic Law 19/2003 and Law 62/200338 the 
Spanish legislator addressed a long-reiterated demand39 that jurisdiction for the conduct 
of internal exequatur proceedings, which (formerly) lay with the TS (Tribunal Supremo: 
Supreme Court), be transferred to the JPIs (Juzgados de Primera Instancia: Courts of 
First Instance)40. This meant that competence to deal with any recognition procedure at 
first instance fell to the said courts regardless of which instrument was applicable: 
article 955 LEC 1881 as it currently stands would assign competence to the courts of 
first instance, coinciding not only with the LC (art 32), Reg. 44/2001 (art 39.1 and 
annex II) and Reg. 2201/2003 (art 29.2 and corresponding ‘list’41), but also with several 
bilateral conventions which remit to internal exequatur procedures for all other 
purposes42; thus, before the reform, the internal exequatur procedure had to be pursued 
through bodies other than the one that normally possessed jurisdiction (i.e., the TS)43.  
 However, the simplicity that such uniformity would have brought has been 
considerably compromised with the latest reform of the Judiciary Act [LOPJ] 
introduced by Organic Law 13/2007 of 19 November44. This statute adds a new section 
to article 86 ter whereby the Juzgados de lo Mercantil (Juvenile Courts: hereafter, JMs) 
have jurisdiction ‘for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and other 
judicial and arbitral decisions where these concern matters within their competence, 
unless they have to be dealt with by another court or tribunal under treaties or other 
international norms’. In so doing the new section presents two problems. The first is 
that it reintroduces differentiated treatment of the competence to recognise decisions 
dealing with matters for which jurisdiction is attributed to the JM (“unless they have to 
be dealt with by another court or tribunal...”). Thus, notwithstanding if a foreign 
decision deals with any of the matters listed as ‘commercial’ in art. 86.2 ter LOPJ 
(matters which are attributed to the JM), jurisdiction will be endorsed to the JPIs if such 
decision comes under the LC, Reg. 44/2001 or a bilateral convention remitting to the 
internal procedure of the requested State and assigning competence expressly to the 
                                                 
38 Cit. 
39 See REMIRO BROTONS, A., Ejecución de sentencias extranjeras en España. La jurisprudencia 
del Tribunal Supremo, Tecnos, Madrid, 1974, pp. 282-283; and in connection with recognition of the 
enforceability of arbitral decisions, ÁLVAREZ GONZÁLEZ, S., “Los Juzgados de Primera Instancia ante el 
exequátur de laudos arbitrales extranjeros”, RCEA, 1986, pp. 53-65. 
40 On the reform, see the reference in note 6 supra.  
41 List 1 of the “Information relating to courts and redress procedures pursuant to Article 68 of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000”, OJEC, C40, 17 February 2005.  
42 For instance, in the conventions signed by Spain with the following States (all cited earlier): 
Brazil (art. 22),  Bulgaria (art. 20), China (art. 18); Israel (art. 5.2); El Salvador (art. 13); Morocco (art. 
25); Mexico (art. 19); Romania (art. 14); Tunisia (art. 21); Uruguay (art. 9); the USSR (i.e. Russian 
Federation: art. 24). Competence under the Spanish-Swiss Convention is controversial: whereas it is not 
expressly attributed to the courts of first instance according to VULLIEMIN, J.-M., “El Tratado entre 
España y Suiza sobre la ejecución recíproca de sentencias o fallos en materia civil o comercial de 19 de 
noviembre de 1896: la autoridad española competente en materia de exequátur”, RGD, 1988, pp. 1219-
1231, it is so attributed according to REMIRO BROTÓNS, A., op cit., pp. 281-283 y GARAU SOBRINO, F.F., 
“El reconocimiento en España de las resoluciones judiciales extranjeras en materia matrimonial”, Puntos 
capitales de Derecho de familia en su dimensión internacional, Dykinson, Madrid, 1999, pp. 303-331, 
esp. p. 317. See also ÁLVAREZ GONZÁLEZ, S., loc. cit., pp. 54-56. 
43 With all the drawbacks that this could entail. For example as regards the possibility of 
appealing decisions of JPI conducting internal exequatur proceedings, bearing in mind that the bilateral 
conventions make no provision in this respect and that in this procedure the decisions of the TS were not 
susceptible of appeal. On this problem at the present time, see §15 below. 
44 LO 13/2007 of 19 November for extraterritorial prosecution of illegal trafficking or 
clandestine immigration of persons, BOE, no. 278, 20/11/2007.  
JPIs. In other words, for the conduct of any of the proceedings provided in the 
instruments concerned (LC, Reg. 44/2001 or Reg. 2201/2003) only the JPIs will be 
competent, even if the matter is ‘commercial’; and in the conduct of the internal 
exequatur procedure the JMs will be competent only insofar as the bilateral convention 
applicable to the recognition does not attribute jurisdiction to the JPIs. The second 
problem relates to the attribution of competence to the JMs “for recognition and 
enforcement of judgments and other judicial and arbitral decisions where these deal 
with matters for which it is competent”45. It will bring about a considerable complexity 
in demarcating the competence of the two types of body (JPI and JM) in non-
bankruptcy proceedings, and particularly in connected matters46. 
 
 
B. Local jurisdiction  
 
 6. The determination of the body with territorial or local jurisdiction for the 
recognition proceedings differs largely according to the applicable instrument. For in 
fact not only is there a specific rule for each procedure—i.e. the ones provided in the LC 
(art 32.2), in Reg. 44/2001 (art 39.2), in Reg. 2201/2003 (art 29.2) and the internal 
exequatur procedure (art 955 LCE 1881)—but also some bilateral conventions provide 
rules on territorial jurisdiction of courts of first instance where these are assigned 
competence.  
 Insofar as the criteria governing local jurisdiction are determined specifically for 
each recognition proceeding, the special (institutional or conventional) norms displace 
the provisions that regulate local jurisdiction in a general way (i.e., arts. 50-60 LEC 
2000)47. These rules cannot therefore be construed as being dispositive48: the party 
applying for recognition must demonstrate fulfilment of the criteria laid down for the 
proceeding to continue49, and the requested court must verify its jurisdiction ex officio50. 
                                                 
45 As postulated by OÑA LÓPEZ, M.M., loc. cit., p. 4. 
46 This complexity was already noted in the first criticisms that were raised to the creation of 
Juvenile Courts in Spanish system: see inter alia EIZAGUIRRE BERMEJO, J.M., “Los Juzgados de lo 
mercantil: un atentado contra la seguridad jurídica”, Diario La Ley, no. 5648, 2002, pp. 1-6. For a later 
confirmation of the insecurity caused by this creation, see inter alia HERRERA CUEVAS, E.J., “De la 
competencia objetiva de los Juzgados de lo mercantil”, ibid., no. 619 of 17 February 2005 
(www.laley.net).     
47 Before the cited reform of the 1881 LEC recourse to these rules was necessary when under a 
bilateral convention the internal exequatur procedure had to be pursued through a JPI rather than the TS. 
Note, however, some cases of erroneous application of the rules of local jurisdiction in AAP Baleares 
(Section 5) no. 72/2004 of 22 June (Westlaw, JUR 2004/258132)—application of art. 50 LEC in the 
context of a procedure under Reg. 44/2001; AAP Asturias (Section 1) no. 113/2006 of 3 November (ibid., 
AC 2006/2015)—application of art. 855 LEC 1881 in the context of an internal exequatur procedure; and 
AAP Madrid (Section 10) of 1 October 2001 (ibid., JUR 2004/157864)—application of art. 62 LEC 1881 
in the context of proceedings under the BC. 
48 However, in AAP Granada (Section 3) no. 34/2003 of 12 April (Westlaw, JUR 2003/200924) 
local jurisdiction is determined in application of LEC 2000, in a case when the (Spanish-Moroccan) 
bilateral convention assigns competence to the court of first instance without establishing particular 
criteria. 
49 Thus, AAP Madrid (Section 13) no. 231/2004 of 22 December declined jurisdiction, noting the 
impossibility of ‘recourse to the procedure for enforcement of a foreign judgment in the absence of a prior 
enquiry by the party interested in its enforcement to provide at least some indication as to the existence of 
a some property of the enforcee in the State that is being asked to enforce the said Judgment’ (Westlaw, 
JUR 2005/38527).  
50 See ATS (1st Chamber) of 26 June 2001 (Westlaw, RJ 2001/6586); and AAP Madrid (Section 
12) no.221/2000 of 28 March (cit.). For other cases affirming territorial incompetence of the Spanish 
authorities, see AAP Málaga (Section 4) no. 302/2002 of 5 November (ibid., JUR 2004/139881) and AAP 
 Nevertheless, there are some rules of territorial jurisdiction that grant the party 
requesting recognition a possibility, if a limited one, of choosing the territorially 
competent court. Indeed, the virtual uniformity of the Spanish system as a whole in 
taking the place of domicile51 (or habitual residence) of the party against whom 
recognition is sought52 as the prime criterion for determining local competence53 is 
compromised as regards the possibilities of choice. In some instances the applicant may 
choose between the former forum and that of the place of enforcement54; in others, 
however, the forum of the place of enforcement, or of the place where the judgment is 
to take effect or place of ‘ejecución impropia’55, can only be used in cases where the 
party against whom recognition is sought does not have his place of domicile56 (or 
habitual residence)57 in Spain. It need hardly be said that the particular features of each 
proceeding as regards determining the criteria governing local jurisdiction does not help 
to make the recognition system as a whole easier for the Spanish authorities to manage. 
 
 
2. Intervening parties 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Madrid (Section 12) no. 221/2000 of 28 March (ibid., JUR 2000/198260). See comments on this last 
decision by ARENAS GARCÍA, R., “Reconocimiento y ejecución de sentencias al amparo del Convenio de 
Bruselas de 1968”, AEDIPr, 2002, pp. 550-558, esp. pp. 557-558.  
51 This criterion is determined in a uniform manner for natural persons in accordance with 
internal rules (art. 40 Cc), in application of any instrument (see the reference to Spanish law in arts 52 LC 
and 59.1 Reg. 44/2001): see ATS (1st Chamber) of 26 June 2001, cit., and AAP Santa Cruz de Tenerife 
(Section 3) no. 95/2000 of 25 May (Westlaw, AC 2000/3817). In the case of legal persons, uniform 
application may vary when Reg. 44/2001 is applied given the breadth of the domicile criterion in art. 60. 
52 Art. 955 LEC 1881 allows not only the award of jurisdiction to the JPI of the domicile or place 
of residence of the party against whom recognition or enforcement is sought, but also to the JPI of the 
domicile or place of residence of the person affected by such recognition or enforcement. 
53 Only art. 2 of the Spanish-Swiss Convention determines that enforcement is to be 
implemented ‘by the court or authority of the place where enforcement is to take place, and who is 
competent to grant exequatur’. 
54  For instance, in the procedure under Reg. 44/2001 (art. 39.2): see AAP Gerona (Section 2) no. 
169/2004 of 2 November (Westlaw, AC 2004/2251); and in the internal exequatur procedure, when the 
Spanish-Salvadoran Convention (art. 13) or the Spanish-Romanian Convention (art. 14.2) is applicable. 
55 The ‘place where enforcement of the judgment is to take effect’ is the last 
forum under art. 955 LEC 1881. It avoids the lacuna that once existed in connection 
with the determination of territorial jurisdiction for the recognition of decisions in cases 
of marital breakdown, and which had hitherto been compensated for, in the absence of 
any other criterion, by awarding jurisdiction to the JPI of the place where the marriage 
was registered. See ATS (Civil Chamber) of 2 March 1999 (RJA 1999/1900) and 9 
February 1999 (ibid., 1999/1001). Note that this forum does not establish an open 
criterion susceptible of interpretation, such as that of the place that ‘was the domicile 
where the applicant was born, to which he occasionally travels and in which he has 
relatives and friends’, as noted in AAP Asturias (Section 1) no. 113/2006 of 2 
November, cit. 
56 That is the case of the procedure under the LC (art. 32.2). The expectation would be similar 
with regard to the internal exequatur procedure where recognition is governed by the Spanish-Mexican 
Convention, art. 19 of which provides that the forum shall be the domicile or place of residence of the 
convicted party, or failing that of the place where his goods are situated in the territory of the requested 
State. 
57  For instance, in the conduct of the procedure for declaration of enforceability of decisions in 
matters of parental responsibility, as it relates both to the habitual residence of the party against whom 
recognition is sought and to the habitual residence of the child or children referred to in the application, in 
Reg. 2201/2003 (art. 29.2).  
A. Right to intervene as a party in the recognition proceedings 
 
 7. Articles 25 and 31 LC, 33 and 38 Reg. 44/2001 and 21 and 28 Reg. 2201/2003 all 
provide that any interested party may apply for recognition of a judgment on a principal 
issue or seek a declaration of enforceability. This presents a degree of uncertainty (what 
is an interested party?), which is however inevitable. As in the case of the internal 
Spanish system, which lacks any rule regulating the particular capacity that parties have 
to possess in order to intervene in the exequatur proceedings, it must be assumed that 
this capacity is not confined to those who were parties in the proceedings concluded by 
the decision for which recognition is sought and the assignees and representatives of 
those parties58. It also applies to any other person who can demonstrate a legitimate 
interest59, an issue that can only be determined in each particular case60. 
 While the interests of the parties affected by the foreign decision could coincide, in 
most cases recognition is sought because the party on the losing end in the foreign suit 
does not comply with the terms of the decision and hence the applicant seeks to have 
these enforced61. This means that for purposes of passive legitimation the recognition 
procedure must be initiated against whoever was a party in the foreign proceedings or 
their assigns. Where such a party is a legal person, any lifting of the veil that may be in 
order to justify the application for enforcement against another person connected with 




B. Role of the Public Prosecution Service 
 
                                                 
58 However, see STS (Civil Chamber) of 12 February 2000 (RAJ 2000, 759) and my ‘Note’ in 
REDI, 2001, pp 481-486. This was the position traditionally adopted by the Spanish doctrine, albeit 
before the Spanish Constitution came into force: for all purposes see REMIRO BROTÓNS, A., o. cit., p 286.  
59 As postulated by ARAGONESES ALONSO, P., in “Procedimiento para el exequátur de sentencias 
civiles extranjeras en España”, RDPr, 1952, pp 551-569, esp. p 557. Recent Spanish doctrine concurs on 
this point: see FERNÁNDEZ ROZAS, J.C. and SÁNCHEZ LORENZO, S., Derecho internacional privado, 4ª 
ed., Madrid, Civitas, 2007, p 207; VIRGÓS SORIANO, M. and GARCIMARTÍN ALFÉREZ, F.J., op. cit., pp 
679-680; CALVO CARAVACA A.L. and CARRASCOSA GONZÁLEZ, J., Derecho internacional privado, vol. I, 
8ª ed., Granada, Comares, 2007, p 355; ABARCA JUNCO, P. and PÉREZ VERA, E. (Dir.), Derecho 
internacional privado, Vol. I, 3rd ed., Madrid, UNED, 2001, p 446. 
60 See my “Nota a Auto TS (Sala de lo Civil) de 12 de febrero de 2000” passim, cit. 
61 Therefore recognition procedures offer the party against which recognition is sought the means 
of opposing it as a guarantee of the right of defence, for all that their purpose is a harmonising rather than 
a contentious one: see STC 54/1989 of 23 February, BOE no. 62, 14-III-1989 and Note by DESANTES 
REAL, M. en REDI, 1989, pp 627-639; see also GONZÁLEZ CAMPOS, J.D., “The Spanish Constitution and 
Private International Law in constitutional jurisprudence”, SYIL, 2003, pp 1-59, esp. pp 21 and 22.  
62 As noted by ARENAS GARCÍA, R. in his comments on AAP Málaga of 9 February 2000, in 
“Reconocimiento y ejecución…”, loc. cit., p 557. In the case settled in those proceedings recognition and 
‘enforcement’ was requested against “La Costa SL” when in fact the company convicted in the German 
decision was “La Costa Ltd.”. For identical examples (admission of an appeal against decisions by 
different JPI of Málaga recognising and—erroneously—ordering enforcement of German decisions 
against La Costa SL, see AAP of Málaga (Section 6) nos 140/1999 of 28 June (Westlaw, AC 1999/1599); 
173/2000 of 20 June (ibid., JUR 2000/283925); 271/2000 of 26 October (ibid., JUR 2001/45299); 
260/2000 of 18 October (ibid., JUR 2001/44012); 270/2000 of 18 October (ibid., JUR 2001/106836); 
237/2000 of 20 September (ibid., JUR 2001/75705); 48/2001 of 19 February (ibid., AC 2001/1424). See 
also a case of admission to appeal for the (improper) ordering of enforcement measures in proceedings for 
recognition of a German decision against the representative of the company convicted in SAP Baleares 
(Section 4) no. 738/2001 of 16 November (ibid., JUR 2002/42058). 
 8. Another bone of contention in the praxis of the Spanish authorities is the role 
played by the Public Prosecution Service (Ministerio Fiscal) in proceedings regulated 
by the LC, Reg. 44/2001 or Reg. 2201/2003 where such intervention occurs in 
application of article 956 LEC63 (which so ordains for the internal exequatur 
proceedings) in cases where the cited instruments make no provision for the point at 
issue64. It seems from the practice of most Spanish authorities that the fact that the 
proceedings conducted through the JPIs in application of these instruments are not 
adversarial (see §13 below) is felt to justify this formality being eschewed65. 
Nonetheless, there is no lack of courts which have taken the view that given the silence 
of these instruments on this point, such intervention is mandatory in view of the 
subsidiary role of the lex fori, i.e. in application of article 956 LEC 188166.   
 The argument proffered against mandatory intervention is a powerful one. If the 
party against whom recognition is sought is not given a hearing at first instance67, it 
would hardly seem to be indispensable for the Public Prosecution Service to have it—
especially if the proceeding is the one provided in Reg. 44/2001, which further excludes 
the option for the JPI to examine any grounds for refusal of recognition. If in this 
procedure the court itself cannot oppose enforcement of a judgment from another 
Member State unless the requisite documents are not produced (see §§11 and 13 
below), it makes no sense for the Public Prosecution Service to be required to issue a 
report. Therefore, if upheld, intervention would only be mandatory at first instance in 
the other two proceedings or at second instance68 in any of the three. Hence, given that 
any differentiation between these procedures or the stages thereof would be artificial, it 
might be more appropriate to assume that article 956 LEC 1881 is not applicable. The 
fact is that in such cases the Public Prosecution Service could play the role assigned it in 
the internal rules, which is to assure that the law is adhered to. But this line of argument 
                                                 
63 That is, other than in cases where the PPS must mandatorily intervene as representative or 
defender of those lacking capacity to act or legal representation. Thus, the need for such a hearing would 
be absolute, for instance within the framework of the LC or Reg. 44/2001, in an application for 
recognition of a decision on maintenance in representation or defence of a child; or in Reg. 2201/2003, 
when recognition affects a decision on parental responsibility. 
64 It seems clear that art. 956 LEC 1881 is not applicable as the provision referred to by the LC 
(art 33.1), Reg. 44/2001 (art 40.1) or Reg. 2201/2003 (art 30.1) where they establish that the internal rules 
govern ‘the procedure for making the application’. The issue of a report by the Public Prosecution Service 
is not strictly speaking relevant to the ‘procedure for making the application’. Nevertheless, for an 
instance of this argument being used as one of the underpinnings of an appeal by a party opposing 
recognition and the court failing to rebut it in the terms cited here, see AAP Madrid (Section 13) of 2 July 
2002 (Westlaw, JUR 2003/48664). 
65 For examples in application of the BC proceeding, see STS (Civil Chamber, 
Section 1) no. 387/2004 of 4 April, (Westlaw, RJ 2006/1917); AAP Madrid (Section 13) 
of 2 July 2002 (cit.); AAP Castellón (Section 3) no. 478/2000 of 8 September (ibid., AC 
2002/5116); and AAP La Rioja (Sole Section) nos 135/2001 of 19 October (ibid., AC 
2002/306) and 60/2003 of 21 May (ibid., JUR 2003/167469). 
66 For instance, in a ruling of 8 February 2000 (Westlaw, AC 2000/107), the AP Guipúzcoa 
(Section 2) asserted that the requirement set out in art. 956 LEC is indispensable albeit remediable: it 
considered the requirement satisfied by the Public Prosecution Service’s intervention in the appeal 
proceedings. 
67 In some decisions the courts note that the Public Prosecution Service has been granted a 
hearing at first instance; but in some cases notice of the application for recognition had also, erroneously, 
been sent to party against whom recognition was being sought: see for example AAP Alicante (Section 4) 
no. 55/2001 of 22 March (Westlaw, JUR 2001/194928).   
68 In this connection, in AAP Baleares (Section 4) no. 307/2000 of 29 December 
(Westlaw, JUR 2001/96111) it appears that the Public Prosecution Service would only 
act before the AP in proceedings conducted in accordance with the BC. 
perhaps only has real force in the denial of mandatory intervention. In a context like that 
of ‘Private Law’ in which the only State interests that might be affected are those 
relating to the possible collision of the effects of the foreign decision and Spanish public 
policy, the need to assure adherence to the law is very relative inasmuch as these 
proceedings are only conducted when the decisions are from Member States, or at most 
other States parties to the LC. As we know, application of the public policy clause is 
most exceptional when it comes to enforcing decisions from these States. In short, if the 
intention of the conventional or institutional legislator is to simplify these procedures as 
much as possible, the most appropriate interpretation is that the lack of any express 
provision bars Member States or States parties from imposing this formality. It therefore 
follows that subsidiary application of the lex fori is not appropriate on this point in view 
of the possible harm that adherence thereto may cause to the ‘effectiveness’ of the LC 
or the Community regulations69.  
 
 
3. Documentation required 
 
 9. The documents that are demanded and the requirements that these have to meet 
under the internal exequatur procedure are perfectly valid in any other procedure. In 
order to simplify the proceedings as much as possible, both LC, Reg. 44/2001 and Reg. 
2201/2003 refer to the relevant sections of the ‘common provisions’ (arts 33.3 LC, 40.3 
Reg. 44/2001 and 30.3 Reg. 2201/2003) where specific certificates are introduced, in 
order to lessen the number and the formalities of the usual documents. However, despite 
such reference there still remains the possibility of presenting any other documents 
(where appropriate carrying more formalities), since these provisions expressly so 
ordain. To put it in another way, according to the argumentum a maiori ad minus, the 
documents that will secure a favourable decision on recognition in the course of the 
internal exequatur procedure can also be valid under the LC, Reg. 44/2001 or Reg. 
2201/2003 proceedings. We shall therefore do well to start by looking at the 
requirements generally stipulated by the internal rules before looking more closely at 
the facilities provided by the conventional and institutional rules. 
 All proceedings must be initiated with the submission of a writ, signed by a solicitor 
and accompanied by a power of attorney ad litem70, and the original or an authenticated 
copy of the decision71. The rest of the documents that are submitted aim at providing 
evidence supporting compliance with the conditions laid down for recognition or (as far 
as possible) the absence of grounds for refusal; thus, generally speaking the only 
essential thing is to append, in addition to the documents referred to, documentary 
evidence showing that the decision is final and where appropriate enforceable, and that 
                                                 
69 VIRGÓS SORIANO, M. and GARCIMARTÍN ALFÉREZ, F.J., op. cit., p 675, take the view that 
‘there are no reasons to justify the intervention of the Public Prosecution Service’.   
70 As the parties must be defended by a technical director (abogado) and represented by an 
attorney (procurador). The attorney is always an attorney of the court to which the application is 
addressed. Therefore, the power of attorney is enough to satisfy the applicant’s obligation to give ‘an 
address for service of process within the area of jurisdiction of the court applied to’, as provided in LC, 
Reg. 44/2001 and Reg. 2201/2003. Note that if such choice of address is not feasible under the rules of 
the requested State, it must be made by appointing a representative ad litem (arts 33.2 LC, 40.2 Reg. 
44/2001 and 30.2 Reg. 2201/2003). 
71 See arts 46.1 LC, 53.1 Reg. 44/2001 and 37.1a) Reg. 2201/2003. Art. 956 LEC 1881 only 
refers to ‘enforcement’, but there is nothing to prevent—indeed it is quite normal—the submission of an 
authenticated copy of the decision instead of the original: see, ad ex., ATSs (Civil Chamber) of 11 March 
2003, cit.; of 17 May 2005, cit. 
the document instituting the proceedings or other similar document was served in the 
proceedings of origin if the defendant was declared in default. All the documents must 
be accompanied by the appropriate legalisation, or by the ‘apostille’ as the case may 
be72, and a translation73, unless either or both of these formalities is unnecessary 
according to the applicable institutional or conventional instrument. 
 
10. Where documentary requirements are most simplified is in the conduct of 
proceedings regulated in Community regulations. In Reg. 44/2001 such a reduction is 
achieved through the adoption of a standard certificate, provided in Annex V, which 
must be sent along with the copy of the decision as noted (and in Spain also the power 
of attorney ad litem). From a formal standpoint this document, which must be issued by 
the competent authority of the State of origin, provides a means of grouping together all 
the essential information on issues that would otherwise have to be individually proven 
and on the granting of legal aid in the proceedings at origin, which in some cases may 
be of importance for the recognition procedure. But more importantly still, from a 
substantive point of view it further provides the basis for a presumption of lack of 
grounds for the refusal of recognition74. The burden of proof will be reversed: the party 
seeking to prevent the transfer will have to demonstrate the irregularity of the original 
decision75 by appealing through the appropriate channels. It should be stressed at the 
same time that in the event that it should be impossible to produce such a certificate, 
any of the issues may be proven by the submission of some other documentary evidence 
(art. 55.1)76. Furthermore, the requirements for these documents are relaxed, so that 
none will require legalisation or other such formality (nor power of attorney ad litem: 
see art. 56), and an—official—translation will be necessary only if the competent JPI so 
requires in order to conduct the proceedings (art. 55.2). 
For its part, Reg. 2201/2003 provides standard forms in the relevant annexes (I for 
judgments on matrimonial matters, II for judgments on parental responsibility: see art. 
39) which also provide information on the chief aspects: e.g. on the type of judgment, 
and on the type and enforceability of the judgment respectively, and whether legal aid 
was granted in both cases. Thus, it dispenses with the need for submission of any other 
specific documents. But the two forms differ from the one provided in Reg. 44/2001 in 
that they contain no mention of the service of the document instituting the proceedings 
or equivalent document, so that if the proceedings in the State of origin were conducted 
                                                 
72 If they come under the Hague Convention of 5 October 1961 Abolishing the Requirement of 
Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents, BOE, no. 229, 25/09/1978. 
73 Which must be official, assuming that is what is meant by the phrase ‘done in accordance with 
the law’ in art. 956 LEC 1881. Note in this connection that LEC 2000 only requires the presentation of an 
official translation of foreign public documents not drafted in Spanish, or where applicable in the official 
language of the Autonomous Community concerned, if a private translation presented originally is 
challenged (art. 144 LEC 2000). 
74 With regard to the issues there accredited. For instance, if the service of notice on the 
defendant in the original proceedings or an equivalent document is certified by the authority of the State 
of origin, the burden of proof that the defendant has nonetheless been rendered defenceless—i.e. that he 
did not receive it ‘in adequate time and manner’ to enable him to prepare a defence—and was unable to 
appeal the decision lies with the party (in default) against whom recognition is sought. If there is no 
record of that party having appealed or offered a challenge or other representation against the decision, 
there can be no grounds for not accepting such certification: see AAP Madrid (Section 21) no. 262/2006 
of 28 April (Westlaw, AC 2006/1028) and AAP Madrid (Section 13) no. 68/2006 of 30 March (ibid., JUR 
2006/193593). 
75 Cf. GUZMÁN ZAPATER, M., “Un elemento federalizador para Europa: el reconocimiento mutuo 
en el ámbito del reconocimiento de decisiones judiciales”, RDCE, 2001, pp. 405-438, esp. p. 436. 
76 See AAP Gerona (Section 2) no. 169/2004 of 2 November (Westlaw, AC 2004/2251); AAP 
Lugo (Section 1) no. 267/2003 of 2 July (ibid., AC 2003/1809). 
in default of appearance, that fact must necessarily be certified (see arts 37-39). For the 
rest, this Regulation also exempts all documents from the requirement of legalisation or 
other similar formality (art. 52), and it allows a translation to be dispensed with unless 
the court requires one (art. 38.2). 
Finally, it should further be noted that within the framework of conduct of the LC 
procedure (see arts. 46-49), the main advantages for the person applying for recognition 
are the absence of a requirement for legalisation or other similar formality for all 




III. CONDUCT OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
 
1. Proceedings at first instance 
 
A. Non-adversarial proceedings 
 
 11. The most remarkable feature of the proceedings contemplated in the LC, Reg. 
44/2001 and Reg. 2201/2003—and the chief advantage that they afford the applicant for 
recognition—is the absence of an adversarial procedure at first instance. One point that 
the three instruments have in common is that they lay down proceedings which make no 
allowance for service of notice of institution on the party against whom such 
recognition is sought, as the latter is not permitted to make any submissions at this point 
(arts 34 CL, 41 Reg. 44/2001 and art. 31 Reg. 2201/2003). The court applied to must 
render its decision ‘without delay’ and inaudita alteram parte, a fact that is not 
prejudicial to this other party’s rights of defence since he may present grounds for the 
refusal of recognition through the appropriate appeal proceedings77. Such decision must 
take the form of an ‘auto’, in subsidiary application of the rules on internal exequatur 
procedure (art. 956 LEC 1881). Notice of that ‘auto’ must immediately be served on the 
applicant by the ‘secretario judicial’ (a given clerk of court)78, in the manner prescribed 
by Spanish law (arts 35 CL, 42 Reg. 44/2001 and 32 Reg. 2201/2003). Thus, given the 
applicant’s obligation to provide an address for service within the court’s area of 
jurisdiction, the rules applicable to notification will be articles 149 to 168 LEC 2000. 
Moreover, the decision of the JPI must also be brought to the notice of the other party79: 
under the cited articles if the party is domiciled in Spain, and if the party is domiciled 
abroad, either following the provisions of Regulation 1/2005 of the Consejo General del 
                                                 
77 In application of the procedure provided in the BC, see the dismissal of appeals brought on the 
grounds—inter alia—of failure to allow a hearing to the party against whom recognition was sought, in 
AAP Gerona (Section 2) no. 190/2000 of 22 November (cit.); AAP Castellón (Section 3) no. 478/2000 of 
8 September (cit.); SAP Cádiz (Section 8) no. 318/2001 of 21 November (Westlaw, JUR 2002/42671); 
AAP Gerona (Section 2) no. 58/2002 of 4 April (ibid., JUR 2002/183266); AAP Valencia (Section 6) no. 
123/2002 of 13 June (ibid., AC 2002/1371); and AAP La Rioja (Sole Section) no. 60/2003 of 21 May 
(ibid., JUR 2003/167469). 
78 Only the LC (Spanish version) makes express reference to the ‘secretario judicial’. This clerk 
will nevertheless also be responsible for notifying in application of Reg. 44/2001 and Reg. 2201/2003, in 
application of art. 152 LEC 2000. 
79 This must apply to all proceedings despite the fact that neither the LC nor Reg. 2201/2001 
makes express mention of such service, unlike art. 42.2 Reg. 44/2001. Moreover, the reference in the 
latter to the decision on the application for a ‘declaration of enforceability’ should not be taken literally. 
Notice of the decision must be served, whether or not the applicant’s request is granted. 
Poder Judicial80 in implementation of articles 276-278 LOPJ and 177 LEC 2000, or the 
provisions of whatever regulation or convention is applicable81. 
 The feature that differentiates the recognition or declaration of enforceability procedure 
provided in Reg. 44/2001 from the other two82 concerns the object of the decision that has 
to be taken by the JPI rather than strictly procedural issues: whereas in application of the 
LC (art. 34.2) and Reg. 2201/2003 (art. 31.2) the court may refuse an application only for 
reasons specified in certain articles (arts 27 or 28 CL and 22, 23 or 24 Reg. 2201/2003), 
the only grounds for which the court may refuse recognition under Reg. 44/2001 is failure 
to submit the documents discussed above83. The grounds for refusal provided in articles 34 
and 35 Reg. 44/2001 will be checked only if the party against whom the declaration of 
enforceability is sought lodges an appeal (art. 45.1). In any case none of the instruments 
allow a decision to be reviewed as to its substance at any stage (arts 29 CL, 24 Reg. 
2201/2003 and 36 Reg. 44/2001). 
 What all this amounts to is that recognition, in the sense of a ruling on recognisability 
may be the specific object of the procedure regulated in Reg. 44/2001 only if contested by 
way of appeal, but not at first instance84. But despite that, for the same reason it is possible 
to derive conclusions of a procedural nature from this ‘novel aspect’ of Reg. 44/2001. If 
the JPI is only able to verify formal correctness85, the faculties of such requested authority 
will be similar to those of some systems which merely ‘record’ the foreign decision86, so 
that such a formal check could actually be performed by an accessory of the court or 
tribunal to which conduct of the proceedings falls87. For that purpose it would suffice to 
include the assignment of this task in an annex; but in fact Spanish law does not designate 
                                                 
80 Resolution of the Plenum of the Consejo General del Poder Judicial of 15 September 2005 
approving Regulation 1/2005 on accessory aspects of judicial actions , BOE, no. 231, 27-IX-05): see Title 
IV Chapter II. 
81 For fuller coverage see FERNÁNDEZ ROZAS, J.C. and SÁNCHEZ LORENZO, S., op. cit., pp 265-
272 and VIRGÓS SORIANO, M. and GARCIMARTÍN ALFÉREZ, F.J., op. cit., pp 407-420. 
82 Which indeed is the most outstanding of all the reforms made to the BC in its transition to 
Reg. 44/2001, as noted by SÁNCHEZ LORENZO, S. in “Competencia judicial, reconocimiento y ejecución 
de resoluciones judiciales en materia civil y mercantil: el Reglamento 44/2001”, SÁNCHEZ LORENZO, S. & 
MOYA ESCUDERO, M. (Eds.), La cooperación judicial en materia civil y la unificación del Derecho 
privado en Europa, Dykinson, Madrid, 2003, pp. 39-67, esp. p. 62. On the drawbacks not addressed by 
the reform, see my own “El reconocimiento de decisiones…”, loc. cit., passim. 
83 Hence the possibilities of partially recognising a decision, for which all three instruments 
expressly provide (arts 42 CL, 48 Reg. 44/2001 and 36 Reg. 2201/2003), are limited in the first instance 
of the procedure regulated in Reg. 44/2001 to two events: that such partial recognition be requested by the 
party, and that the Regulation itself be materially inapplicable to one or more parts of the foreign 
judgment. In the other two instruments the possibility of partial recognition is not reserved to a second 
instance where there are grounds for refusal based on rulings separable from the foreign decision, for 
example conflict with the international public policy of the requested State. 
84 MERLIN, E., “Riconoscimento ed esecutività della decisione straniera nel regolamento 
"Bruxelles I"”, Riv. dir. proc., 2001, pp. 433-461, esp. p. 450. 
85 See MOSCONI, F., “Un confronto tra la disciplina del riconoscimento de dell'esecuzione delle 
decisioni straniere nei recenti regolamenti comunitari”, Riv. int. dir. int. proc., 2001, pp. 545-556, esp. p. 
550. The bar on considering the reasons for refusal applies equally to public policy: cf. WAGNER, R., 
“Von Brüsseler Übereinkommen über die Brussel-I Verordnung zum Europäischen Vollstreckungstitel”, 
IPrax, 2002, pp. 75-95, esp. p. 83. 
86 Cf. PATAUT, E., “L'exécution des jugements nationaux et la Convention de Bruxelles”, Les 
effets des jugements nationaux dans les autres États membres de l'Union Européenne, Bruylant, Brussels, 
2001, pp. 31-53, esp. p. 35. 
87 Cf., for an explanation of the assignment of competence in France, the greffe du tribunal, 
DROZ, G.A.L. y GAUDEMET-TALLON, H., “La transformation de la Convention de Bruxelles du 27 
septembre 1968 en Règlement du Conseil concernant la compétence judiciaire, la reconnaissance et 
l'exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale”, Rev. crit. dr. int. pr., 2001, pp. 601-652, esp. 
pp. 644 and 645. 




B. Adversarial proceedings 
 
 12. The Spanish internal exequatur procedure, unlike the ones discussed heretofore, 
is adversarial from the first instance on. According to article 957 LEC 1881 the party 
‘against’ whom recognition of the foreign decision is sought must be given a summons 
to appear within 30 days88. This provision applies only to cases where such party is 
domiciled in Spanish territory, since it adds that to effect such summons the competent 
body must remit a certificate to the AP (Audiencia Provincial: Provincial High Court) 
of the place where the party is domiciled. Hence, other rules must apply if the party 
against whom recognition is sought is domiciled abroad. In such an event, the 
competent JPI or JM must provide a longer deadline for the appearance if circumstances 
so dictate, and the summons must be executed in accordance with the rules cited above, 
namely the applicable institutional or conventional instrument, or failing that, articles 
276-278 LOPJ and 177 LEC 2000 and, in implementation thereof, Regulation 1/2005 of 
the Consejo General del Poder Judicial.  
Starting on the day of his appearance, the ‘defendant’ still has a ‘period of nine 
days’ in which to respond (art. 956 LEC 1881). If the appearance does not materialise, 
the proceedings continues upon the elapse of the time specified to that effect. In either 
case, as noted earlier, the application is passed on to the Public Prosecution Service, 
which will issue a non-binding report. In light of this report and the submissions of the 
parties, the competent body89 will issue a decision in the form of an ‘auto’ (art. 956 
LEC 1881) as to whether the foreign decision meets the conditions stipulated in the 
applicable bilateral convention or in article 954 LEC 1881, along with any conditions 
that Spanish jurisprudence may have imposed in the autonomous system90. A notice of 
such decision must also be served on the parties in accordance with the cited rules 
governing the service of judicial documents. In any case exequatur, as a mere 
homologation procedure, does not allow for any review of the substance of the foreign 
decision. 
 
2. Adoption of provisional measures 
 
 13. A declaration of enforceability issued under the proceedings regulated in the LC, 
Reg. 44/2001 and Reg. 2201/2003 does not cause the immediate opening of the relevant 
enforcement proceedings. These proceedings can only be initiated upon expiry of the 
                                                 
88 Obviously, if the application for exequatur is made jointly, such an appearance will be 
unnecessary: cf. IGLESIAS BUHIGUES, J.L., “Reconocimiento y ejecución de sentencias extranjeras de 
divorcio”, Cursos de Derecho internacional de Vitoria-Gasteiz 1984, Servicio Editorial del Universidad 
del País Vasco, Bilbao, 1985, pp. 241-279, esp. p. 273. 
89 Art. 956 LEC 1881 uses the term Tribunal (court) and not Juez (judge), what let us suppose 
that the legislator probably omitted to update this provision in line with the reform introduced by Law 
62/2003. This omission is especially relevant as regards the rest of the article, in particular the possibility 
of lodging an appeal against a decree of the JPI (infra, §15). 
90 For fuller coverage see FERNÁNDEZ ROZAS, J.C. and SÁNCHEZ LORENZO, S., op. cit., pp. 214-
233 and VIRGÓS SORIANO, M. and GARCIMARTÍN ALFÉREZ, F.J., op. cit., pp. 599-661. 
deadline for the presentation of an appeal91, albeit many Spanish JPIs order the 
enforcement of a foreign decision at the same time as they grant recognition92. During this 
period the LC and Reg. 44/2001 provide that the JPI may order93 provisional measures if 
so requested: under the LC (art. 39) once recognition has been granted; and in proceedings 
under Reg. 44/2001 (art. 47.1) even before such a ruling. In both cases the measures will 
be those established by Spanish law (arts 39 CL and 47 Reg. 44/2001), albeit the 
requirements specified there, such as periculum in mora, fumus boni juris or security are 
unnecessary for their adoption94.  
                                                 
91 One month as from the service of notice if the party against whom enforcement is sought is 
domiciled in Spain, and two months if the party is domiciled in another State: see arts 36 CL, 43.5 Reg. 
44/2001 and 33.5 Reg. 2201/2003.  
92 See, ad ex., SAP Baleares (Section 4) no. 85/2002 of 7 February (Westlaw, JUR 
2002/124680); AAP Baleares (Section 3) nos 136/2001 of 29 May (ibid., JUR 2001/245744), 140/2001 of 
1 June (ibid., JUR 2001/246142), 40/2005 of 15 March (ibid., AC 2005/291) and 122/2006 of 20 June 
(ibid., JUR 2006/225932); AAP Baleares (Section 4) nos 307/2000 of 29 December (ibid., JUR 
2001/9611) and 198/2002 of 31 December (ibid., JUR 2003/75167); AAP Baleares (Section 5) of 22 
September 2003 (ibid., JUR 2004/86726); AAP (Section 15) Barcelona no. 277/1999 of 10 September 
(ibid., AC 1999/6817); AAP Castellón (Section 2) no. 202/2002 of 12 June (ibid., AC 2002/1966); AAP 
Madrid (Section 14) no. 114/2003 of 9 June (ibid., JUR 2003/247093); AAP Madrid (Section 18) nos 
300/2006 of 22 December (ibid., JUR 2007/161935) and 161/2004 of 11 October (ibid., JUR 
2004/300084); AAP Madrid (Section 20) no. 197/2004 of 5 October (ibid., JUR 2005/41464); and AAP 
Las Palmas (Section 3) nos 66/2004 of 26 April (ibid., JUR 2004/150691). In some cases the mistake has 
been made by the AP itself. For instance, ordering seizure on appeal after admitting the appeal against 
refusal of recognition, as in AAP Alicante (Section 4) no. 251/1999 of 23 April (ibid., AC 1999/799). In 
other cases the confusion between a declaration of enforceability and enforcement has led to Spanish 
authorities being declared competent in respect of the former on the basis of rules regulating the latter, for 
instance in AAP Madrid (Section 11) no. 56/2005 of 21 March (ibid., AC 2005/882): see “Note” to this 
decision by FELIU ÁLVAREZ DE SOTOMAYOR, S., in REDI, 2006, pp. 459-462. The recurrence—and 
error—of this approach on the part of Spanish authorities, essentially in application of the BC, has come 
in for a great deal of criticism from the doctrine: see inter alia ESTEBAN DE LA ROSA, G., in “Nota a AAP 
de Vizcaya (Sección 4ª) de 19 de junio de 1996”, REDI, 1996, pp. 282-286; ARENAS GARCÍA, R., 
“Problemas derivados del sistema de recursos previsto en el Convenio de Bruselas”, AEDIPr, 2001, pp. 
868-871, esp. pp. 869 and 870; id., “Reconocimiento y ejecución …”, loc. cit., pp. 555-557; TORRES 
YANES, F., in his comments on AJPI Bilbao no. 10 of 15 October 2001, AEDIPr, 2003, pp. 910-913. 
93  The JPI is also competent when recognition is granted by decision of the AP upholding an 
appeal by the applicant against refusal of recognition by the former: see AAP Baleares (Section 4) no. 
37/2000 of 15 February (Westlaw, AC 2001/2423). 
94 As laid down by CJEC’s Judgment of 3 October 1986 in Case C-119/84, 
Capelloni et Aquilini v Pelkmans, Recueil, 1985, pp. 3147 et seq. With specific 
reference to the doctrine of the CJEC, see AAP Barcelona (Section 15) of 4 March 2004 
(Westlaw, AC 2004/1550) and the comments on this decision by HERNÁNDEZ 
RODRÍGUEZ, A., in AEDIPr, 2005, pp. 1046-1048. In a similar vein see also AAP 
Burgos (Section 3) no. 178/2005 of 15 April (Westlaw, JUR 2005/101793) and Note on 
that ruling by GARAU SOBRINO F.F. in REDI, 2005, pp. 976-980, and AAP Madrid 
(Section 10) no. 167/2007 of 11 July (ibid., JUR 2007/336746). On the other hand, see a 
different interpretation by the Public Prosecution Service, admitted by the TS, according 
to which the literal reading of the provision allowing the adoption of provisional 
measures (in casu, art. 39 BC) ‘means that the competent court has the option of 
ordering them or not in accordance with the national law, for any other interpretation 
would collide with that article and with article 24 of the Constitution, and moreover 
article 1400 LECiv/1881 may not be applied in such a way as to infringe article 39 of 
the Brussels Convention since its role is not merely supplementary  but rather the cited 
provisions are complementary, and the party seeking the measures has furnished no 
 Unlike the instruments discussed above, the Spanish internal exequatur procedure 
makes no express provision for the adoption of provisional measures. Nonetheless, such 
measures must certainly be allowable95, always provided that the general requirements laid 
down in the rules governing civil procedure are met (arts. 721 et seq. LEC 2000). Hence, if 
the party favoured by the foreign decision considers it necessary to assure the enforcement 
of the guardianship awarded by that decision, he or she may ask the JPI ‘of the place where 
the decision is to be enforced or is to take effect’ (art. 724 LEC 2000)—i.e., the JPI that 
conducted the exequatur procedure96 —to order one of the measures provided for in 
Spanish law (art. 727 LEC 2000).  
 
 
3. Appeal regime 
 
A. Available appeals 
 
 14. Because the proceedings regulated in the LC, Reg. 44/2001 and Reg. 2201/2003 
are non-adversarial, it is only at the appeal stage that the party against whom recognition is 
sought can present grounds for contesting such recognition. As noted, in the event of an 
appeal these grounds will be examined for the first time within the framework of the 
procedure regulated in Reg. 44/2001. Once notice of the JPI’s decision is served, the party 
against whom recognition is sought—but also the applicant (art. 40.1 LC, art. 43.1 Reg. 
44/2001 and art. 33.1 Reg. 2201/2003) in the event that the decision is wholly or partially 
negative97—may appeal to the AP (arts 37.1 and 40.1 LC, art. 43.2 and Annex III Reg. 
44/2001 and art. 33 Reg. 2201/2003 and list 2 of the Information98). To that end the party 
has one month if resident in Spain, and two months, non-extendible, if resident abroad, in 
which to lodge an appeal (arts 36 LC, 43.5 Reg. 44/2001 and 33.5 Reg. 2201/2003). An 
appeal in cassation may also be brought against the AP’s judgment before the TS (art. 41 
                                                                                                                                               
evidence that the defendant has concealed or undervalued his assets’ in STS (Civil 
Chamber, Section 1) no. 845/2006 of 5 September (Westlaw, RJ 2006/6375). 
95 As the TS ruled when it considered the exequatur proceedings, although it declined 
jurisdiction in favour of the JPI competent for purposes of enforcement: see ATS (Civil Chamber) of 29 
January 2002 (Westlaw, JUR 2002/48100) and ATS (Civil Chamber) of 16 April 2002 (ibid., JUR 
2002/120052). 
96 Thus reinterpreting the above-cited art. 724 LEC 2000 in the light of art. 955 LEC 1881: cf. 
VIRGÓS SORIANO, M. and GARCIMARTÍN ALFÉREZ, F.J., op. cit., p. 681. This ‘reinterpretation’ is 
appropriate in view of the drawbacks resulting from the dissociation between the bodies competent to 
adopt measures and to rule on recognition, given that approval must meet the criterion of fumus boni 
juris. In fact this argument was accepted by the TS in its Auto of 29 January 2002 (cit.), even although it 
finally denied its own competence to order provisional measures in the light of other factors. Since the 
transfer of competence from the TS to the JPIs or JMs, such factors (lack of means of appeal from the 
Supreme Court’s decision, the fact that the latter is not a court of instance, procedural efficacy and 
economy…) are no longer relevant. The possibility of applying the territorial criteria enshrined in the 
rules of recognition (LEC 1881), even before the latest reform, is also defended by GRÀCIA I 
CASAMITJANA, J. in comments on the TS rulings cited above: “Medidas cautelares en procedimientos de 
exequátur”, AEDIPr, 2004, pp. 782-784, esp. p. 783. 
97 Along the same lines see GARAU SOBRINO, F.F., “Nota a Auto Audiencia Provincial de 
Vizcaya núm 218/2005 (Sección 3ª), de 22 de marzo de 2005”, REDI, 2006, pp. 462-465, esp. p. 465. In 
such cases security is required to guarantee the other party’s right to a defence. In this connection see § 16 
infra. 
98 See “Información relativa a los órganos jurisdiccionales y las vías de recurso de conformidad 
con el artículo 68 del Reglamento 2201/2003...”, cit.  
LC, art. 44 and annex IV Reg. 44/2001 and art. 38 Reg. 2201/2003 and list 3 of the 
Information99).  
 The provision made in the conventional and institutional regulations regarding appeals 
is so scanty that these have to be based almost entirely on internal rules of procedure100. It 
is these that determine the conditions and causes of admissibility101, and likewise, as we 
shall see further below, all the formalities that have to be followed. The only limitation 
on the application of such internal provisions is that they must not detract from the 
effectiveness of the conventional or institutional instrument. For instance, in the case of 
appellable decisions, it is de rigeur to adopt the restrictive interpretation that the CJEC 
has been accepting in view of the purpose of the recognition proceedings: only the 
above-cited appeal and appeal in cassation may be brought102, and only against 
decisions granting or refusing recognition, and appeal therefrom respectively103. 
However, another equally restrictive interpretation, this time regarding the grounds of 
appeal in cassation, could derogate from that purpose: i.e. that sustained by the TS in 
ruling that cassation is only available for the cases listed in article 477.2.3 LEC 2000104, 
that is only when the decision ‘has cassational interest’105.  
 
 15. As regards the Spanish internal exequatur procedure, article 956.2 LEC 1881 
provides that there can be no appeal against the decision to grant or refuse recognition. 
This restriction of instances is probably due to an oversight on the part of the 
legislator106, who in the last reform of the exequatur procedure presumably failed to 
realise that in transferring jurisdiction to the JPIs, some avenue of appeal would be 
                                                 
99 Ibid.  
100 See FUENTES CAMACHO, V., “El recurso de casación en la ejecución de resoluciones 
judiciales extranjeras y el sistema institucional de Bruselas y Lugano”, Tribunales de Justicia, 1998, no. 
5, pp. 505-519, esp. p. 510; id., “Ámbito del recurso de casación en el marco del Convenio de 
Bruselas/Lugano”, AEDIPr, 2002, pp. 602-604, esp. p. 695. 
101 See STS (Civil Chamber) of 23 March 1999 (Westlaw, RJ 1999/1666) and comments on this 
decision by ARENAS GARCÍA, R., in “Problemas derivados del sistema de recursos…”, loc. cit., p. 869. 
See also STS (Civil Chamber) of 7 February 2002 (Westlaw, RJ 2002/1113). 
102  For a critical view of the restriction of access to extraordinary appeals for infringement of 
procedure, see the comments on STS (Civil Chamber) of 7 February 2002 (cit.) by CARBALLO PIÑEIRO, 
L., “Ámbito del recurso de casación en el marco del Convenio Bruselas/Lugano”, AEDIPr, 2004, pp. 807-
811 
103 None of these appeals is therefore allowable against interim judgments, as noted by GARAU 
SOBRINO, F.F., in “Ámbito del recurso de casación en el marco del Convenio Bruselas/Lugano”, AEDIPr, 
2005, pp. 1011-1014, esp. p. 1011. Note that CJEC’s Judgment (Sixth Chamber) of 4 October 1991, Case 
183/90, Berend Jan Van Dalfsen and others v Bernard Van Loon and others, Recueil, 1991-I, pp. 4743 et 
seq., affirms the inappellability of the decision refusing a stay of proceedings, and CJEC’s Judgment of 
11 August 1995, Case C-432/93, Sisro v Ampersand, Recueil, 1995-I, pp. 2269 et seq., stresses the 
impossibility of invoking internal law to extend the powers vouchsafed in the instrument itself. However, 
on decisions on the admission of appeals as such, see note 109 below. 
104 See the “Criterios sobre recurribilidad, admisión y régimen transitorio en relación con los 
recursos de casación y extraordinario por infracción procesal, regulados en la LEC”, adopted on 12 
December 2000 by decision of the TS’ General Meeting (available in  
http://www.poderjudicial.es/eversuite/GetRecords?Template=cgpj/ts/principal.htm, last visited on 14 
April 2008). 
105 The threat to the effectiveness of Reg. 44/2001 and Reg. 2201/2003 lies in the fact that only 
the TS can put pre-judicial questions to the CJEC on the interpretation of the two instruments: cf. 
FERNÁNDEZ ROZAS, J.C. and SÁNCHEZ LORENZO, S., op. cit., pp. 211. Similarly, see VIRGÓS SORIANO, M. 
and GARCIMARTÍN ALFÉREZ, F.J., op. cit., p. 677. This restriction is also criticised by CARBALLO PIÑEIRO, 
L., loc. cit., p. 809. 
106 See also note  89 supra. 
desirable—in other words this point in the article should have been struck out107. The 
refusal of appeal was (more or less) understandable when the TS was the only body 
competent to handle this procedure; but if it was conducted by a JPI under a bilateral 
convention, the bar on appeals was understood not to apply, since it was a general rule 
which did not fit the case in point108. Hence, today there is no possible justification for 
maintaining the bar on appeals. Although there is no right to a second instance in civil 
proceedings, it is desirable that the decisions of JPIs and JMs be appellable, if only 
because certain conditions of recognition—in particular that the foreign decision be 
compatible with Spanish public policy—need interpretation, which should entail the 
possibility of unifying doctrine. It is more than desirable that appeals be brought against 
the decisions of these local bodies and that if necessary they reach the TS by way of 
cassation. 
However, the possibility of appeal is not only an aspiration; it is in fact a reality to 
judge by Spanish practice. In examining decisions, the JPIs, as the bodies competent to 
examine the appellability of these109, and the APs themselves, are presumably ignoring 
the terms of article 956 LEC 1881. In some cases the admission of the appeal is justified 
on the ground that the JPI has simply refused to admit the application for recognition for 
consideration, without making any ruling on the actual recognition110. But in other cases 
the prohibiting article is simply ignored111. This practice of Spanish jurisprudence on 
the issue could be welcomed; however, since it is contra legem it ought to be 
accompanied by arguments to justify refraining from applying the letter of the law. 
 
 
B. Course of the procedure upon appeal and in cassation  
                                                 
107 It would have sufficed simply to remove it: appeals would then be regulated in accordance 
with the general rules laid down in arts 455 to 467 LEC 2000.  
108 See AAP Madrid (Section 24) of 13 February (Westlaw, JUR 2002/148661) and AAP León of 
December 1992 (ibid., AC 1994/2214).  
109 Within five days starting on the day following service of the decision, the appellant must 
submit a preparatory writ to the court that issued the decision (art. 457 LEC 2000), that is the JPI. This 
authority must check that the decision is appellable and the appeal has been lodged in due time; if so, it 
must issue an order admitting the preparatory writ and direct the appellant to submit it to the AP as 
provided in art. 458 LEC 2000. It is important to note that these rules also apply in the substantiation of 
an appeal under the procedures regulated by the LC, Reg. 44/2001 and Reg. 2201/2003. The fact that 
these instruments provide that the appeal be made to the AP makes no difference, since preparation and 
submission are separate processes: see AAP Madrid (Section 18) of 9 March 2001 (Westlaw AC 
2001/1024) and AAP Málaga (Section 5) no. 163/2003 of 10 June (ibid., JUR 2004/34954). Similarly, the 
regulation governing what appeals are available against the decisions of the JPI regarding the preparation 
of an appeal ought to be extended to cover procedures conducted under the LC, Reg. 2201/2003 and Reg. 
44/2001. For instance, the fact that art. 44 Reg. 44/2001 provides that ‘the judgment given on the appeal 
may be contested only by the appeal referred to in Annex IV’ (my italics) should not prevent the 
admission of appeals that are allowable under Spanish rules of civil procedure against decisions given at 
the preparatory stage of appeals. See for example the admission of an appeal of complaint against the 
decision of a JPI not to admit an appeal, in AAP Madrid (Section 20) no. 219/2004 of 19 October (ibid., 
JUR 2005/41365). 
110 For an analysis (concluding denial) of the applicability of art. 956.2 LEC 1881, see AAP 
Madrid (Section 22) no.217/2007 of 28 September (Westlaw, JUR 2007/353517). An appeal was also 
admitted, although without any mention of the article, by AAP Barcelona (Section 12) no.10/2005 of 27 
January (ibid., JUR 2005/54570).   
111 The appeal was settled without addressing the issue by, among others, AAAP Barcelona 
(Section 12) nos. 153/2005 of 28 July (Westlaw, AC 2006/1554), 37/2006 of 28 February (ibid., JUR 
2006/232193) and 129/2006 of 19 May (ibid., JUR 2006/271096); AAAP Madrid (Section 22) nos. 
160/2005 of 16 June (ibid., JUR 2005/221416) and 214/2007 of 25 September (ibid., JUR 2007/329633); 
and AAP Lérida (Section 2) no. 38/2007 of 20 February (ibid., JUR 2007/249888). 
 
16. As noted earlier, the LC, Reg. 44/2001 and Reg. 2201/2003 only regulate appeal 
proceedings to a very limited extent. Aside from laying down deadlines (discussed above), 
they do no more than require that appeals be dealt with according to the procedure 
governing contradictory matters (arts 37.1 LC, 43.3 Reg. 44/2001 and 33.3 Reg. 
2201/2003), regarding which Reg. 44/2001 stresses that the authority must give a 
decision without delay and may not refuse an application for recognition on any 
grounds other than those specified in the same Regulation. It also reiterates the bar on 
reviewing the decision as to its substance (art. 45)112. All three instruments further 
provide that the decision bringing an end to this procedure must be susceptible of no 
more than one appeal. The nature of that appeal (normally the kind brought against 
decisions at first instance) and which courts are competent to deal with it are matters for 
each Contracting (for CL) or Member State (for both Regulations) (see §14 supra). And 
lastly, they contemplate the possibility of a stay of the proceedings in two cases. 
In the first case, a stay must be ordered if the party seeking recognition is the 
appellant and the party against whom it is sought fails to enter an appearance. In that 
case articles 40.1 LC, 43.4 Reg. 44/2001 and 33.4 Reg. 2201/2003 provide for 
application of the procedural guarantees specified in articles 20 LC, 26 Reg. 44/2001 
and 18 Reg. 2201/2003 respectively, including where such party is not domiciled in a 
Contracting or Member State. Hence, whether on first appeal or in cassation, the 
proceedings must be stayed until it is verified that the party against whom recognition is 
sought has received notice in sufficient time for him to arrange a defence, or that all 
proper steps have been taken to that end. The second case again entails a security, 
stemming from the fact that all three instruments allow the recognition of decisions 
which are not yet firm. In this case the court must stay the proceedings (arts 38.1 LC, 
46.1 Reg. 44/2001 and 35 Reg. 2201/2003)113 or, under the LC and Reg. 44/2001, make 
continuation of the proceedings conditional upon the provision of security (arts 38.3 and 
46.3 respectively), if the party against whom recognition is sought furnishes evidence114 
that an appeal has been lodged against the decision in the State of origin115 or any other 
                                                 
112 While arguably superfluous as reiteration, this provision could have some pedagogical value. 
However, in the Spanish case that hardly seems necessary: in most of the decisions given on appeal the 
courts have upheld appeals lodged against decisions of JPIs which reviewed the merits [e.g. AAP Cádiz 
(Section 8) no. 22/2002 of 7 March (Westlaw JUR 2002/138099)] and dismissed any grounds of 
opposition entailing a review of the merits or objections to enforcement founded on exceptions such as 
compensation or payment -which can nonetheless be invoked in the enforcement procedure: see, ad ex., 
AAP Baleares (Section 5) no. 193/2006 of 13 November (ibid, JUR 2007/46062); AAAP Baleares 
(Section 3) nos 95/2002 of 11 July (ibid. JUR 2002/244565), 128/2004 of 14 October (ibid., JUR 
2004/285896) and 177/2005 of 24 November (ibid., AC 2005/2192); AAP Barcelona (Section 14) no. 
159/2004 of 5 November (ibid., JUR 2005/16445); and AAP La Rioja (Sole Section) no. 135/2001 of 19 
October (ibid., AC 2002/306). 
113 Although these provisions would appear to define an option open to the court dealing with the 
appeal, the fact that the decision could be declared unenforceable suggests that it is an obligation: cf. 
VIRGÓS SORIANO, M. and GARCIMARTÍN ALFÉREZ, F.J., op. cit., pp. 678-679. 
114 The burden of proof lies precisely with that party, so that a stay is not allowable in the 
absence of such evidence: see AAP Navarra (Section 2) no. 1/2002 of 15 January (Westlaw, AC 
2002/1038).  
115 According to Judgment of the CJEC of 22 November 1997, Case 43/77, Industrial Diamond 
Supplies v Riva, Recueil, 1997, pp. 2175 et seq., an appeal that may result in the annulment or amendment 
of judgment which is the subject matter of exequatur constitutes an ‘ordinary appeal’. One must therefore 
take exception to the reasons cited on AAP Baleares (Section 5) no. 65/2002 of 14 June (Westlaw, JUR 
2002/211428) refusing a stay on the proceedings on the ground that continuation did not entail 
enforcement of the decision ‘but the court has confined itself to declaring it enforceable in Spain and 
ordering a provisional measure, and hence there is no reason whatsoever to stay the proceedings’ (see 
form of appeal has been lodged if the judgment was given in the United Kingdom or 
Ireland (arts 38.2 LC, 46.2 Reg. 44/2001, 35.2 Reg. 2201/2003), or if the time for such 
appeal has not yet expired.  
 
17. The absence of express provision for appeals against the judgment of a JPI in 
internal exequatur procedure (which makes no direct reference to non-appellability de 
lege lata, see §14 supra) is sufficient to account for the lack of any express provision in 
Spanish law as regards a first appeal and an appeal in cassation linked to that procedure. 
Spanish judicial authorities follow the general rules provided for appeal and cassation 
when, ignoring the terms of article 957.2 LEC 1881, they settle an appeal lodged against a 
decision by a JPI, and where applicable against a decision by an AP.  
In this procedure a stay is only possible in the first of the cases mentioned, since the 
decision must be firm (art. 951 LEC 1881)116 and hence there is no need for the other 
security discussed above. The proceedings may be stayed where appropriate under the 
terms of the instrument applicable to service of notice to the party against whom 
recognition is sought of the appeal against the refusal of recognition if this party fails to 





A comparison of the norms regulating the procedural aspects of recognition of 
foreign judgments (‘the theory’) with the practice of Spanish authorities in the matter 
like the present one is positive on balance despite the difficulties posed by the excessive 
number of special cases in the normative solutions arrived at and the shortcomings of 
internal regulation, both in the implementation of international instruments and in the 
country’s own internal system. With regard to these shortcomings, the jurisprudence is 
notably integrative on issues like the intervention of the Public Prosecution Service in 
procedures under the LC and Reg. 44/2001 (which it denies) or the admission of appeals 
against decisions by the courts  dealing with exequatur (which it allows). 
Nevertheless, there are still some relatively frequent errors that are solely 
attributable to the judicial authorities themselves, such as failure to distinguish properly 
between the proceedings for a declaration of enforceability and enforcement within the 
framework of the LC or Reg. 44/2001. But the Spanish legislator should help to palliate 
the complexity inherent in an excessive diversity of solutions. The difficulties 
encountered in the application of the rules of recognition would be reduced through a 
modernisation of the internal system, and, in particular, by way of incorporating some 
solutions similar to those contained in conventions and EU regulations as, for example, 
                                                                                                                                               
Fifth Ground). At all events, in the case in point the court would have been justified in dismissing the 
application for a stay on the ground that the appeal lodged in the Member State of origin (a review) was 
not an ordinary one, unless a review can be considered an ‘ordinary appeal’ in this particular sense.  
116 Note that the requirement that the decision be firm also arises in conventions signed by Spain 
under which the internal exequatur procedure is also followed, as pointed out by VIRGÓS SORIANO, M. 
and GARCIMARTÍN ALFÉREZ, F.J., op. cit., p. 605. 
117 Arts 15 and 16 of the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial 
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters of  15 November 1965 (BOE no. 203, 25-VIII-1987, corr. err. 
ibid., no. 88, 13-IV-1989) and art. 19 of Regulation (EC) no. 1397/2007 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 13 November 2007 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial 
documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents), and repealing Council Regulation (EC) 
no. 1348/2000 (fully applicable as from 13 November 2008 according to art. 26 of same).  





ABSTRACT: The present article aims at giving a complete view on the practice of 
Spanish authorities regarding the procedural aspects of recognition and ‘enforcement’ of 
foreign decisions. Subsequent to a brief introduction, the opening section of the work 
focuses on the scope of party autonomy, i.e., the possibilities that the interested parties 
may have in choosing among the several types of recognition and/or proceedings 
existing in the Spanish system, and also in opting for non-recognition. The following 
sections consider the main problems that arise in the development of recognition (or 
declaration of enforcement) proceedings, starting from their initiation. Therefore, it first 
studies the treatment given by judicial authorities to the determination of their 
competence, then to the right to intervene and the role of the Public Prosecution Service 
and finally the documentation required. Secondly, the course of the proceedings is 
examined in its various stages. In the first instance, a difference is laid down between 
non-adversarial and adversarial proceedings. Then, a special consideration is given to 
the adoption of provisional measures before ending with an analysis of the main aspects 
of the appeal regime. 
 
RESUMEN: El presente trabajo analiza el reconocimiento en España de resoluciones 
extranjeras en lo que respecta a cuestiones de índole meramente procedimental y 
fundamentalmente a la luz de la práctica. Aborda, por tanto, las dificultades que plantea 
la existencia de diversos tipos de reconocimiento y de diferentes procedimientos para 
obtenerlo, y da cuenta de la aplicación que del sistema realizan los órganos 
jurisdiccionales españoles.  
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